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NOTES
THE LAW ScHooL-From a total enrollment of 382 regular stu-

dents in all classes for the LL. B. degree, attendance dropped during
the World War period to a minimum of 62. There has been a constantly accelerating recovery since that date, the maximum registration
in the School's history having been attained this fall with a total enrollment of 424, divided as follows: First Year 186, Second Year
I3I, Third Year 103, Graduate 2, Unclassified 2.
When it became evident in the spring of 1927 that applications
for admission to the First Year Class would greatly exceed the maximum seating capacity of the class room (186), the Trustees, on the
recommendation of the Faculty, authorized the limitation of the class
to that number for the ensuing year 1927-1928, admission to be on a
selective basis, from all those presenting approved college. degrees.
The total number of candidates was 325, from which 186 were chosen
by the Admissions Committee of the Law School.
William E. Mikell, Jr., son of Dean Mikell, has been appointed
full time Assistant Professor; Robert Dechert, Esq., and Charles I.
Thompson, Esq., have been reappointed Lecturers.
Mr. Mikell received his A. B. from Yale in 1916 and his LL. B.
from the University of Pennsylvania in 1921. Since graduation he
has been associated in practice with the firm of Saul, Ewing, Remick
and Saul of Philadelphia. He teaches First and Second Year Property, and Sales.
Mr. Dechert received his A. B. in 1916 and his LL. B. in 192I,
both from the University of Pennsylvania. Until 1927 he was associated with the firm of Hepburn, Dechert and Norris of Philadelphia; he is now Vice-President and Counsel of the Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Company. He is in charge of the First Year course in
Torts.
Mr. Thompson, A. B. 1921, LL. B. 1924, University of Pennsylvania, is the son of the Hon. J. Whitaker Thompson, Judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Since graduation he has been associated in practice with the
firm of Ballard, Spahr, Andrews and Madeira of Philadelphia, also
serving for a year as Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia.
He teaches the Second Year course in Evidence.
CONTRIBUTION

BETWEEN

IDENTICAL

SURETIES

ON

SEPARATE

BONDS OF JOINT TORTFEASORS FOR THE BENEFIT OF A REINSURER ON

ONE BoND--An interesting study in the limits of the doctrine of subrogation is presented by a recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in litigation involving two large surety
companies.'
'National Surety Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., ig F. (2d) 448
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
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The National Surety Co. (hereafter referred to as the National
Co.) executed a surety bond in the amount of $2oo,ooo for the State
of Idaho, covering the state against any loss which might arise by reason of the misconduct of its state treasurer, A-' The National Co.
reinfsured one-eighth of the risk with the Massachusetts Bonding
& Insurance Co. (hereafter called the Massachusetts Co.). The
Niational Co. subsequently executed another bond for $25,ooo in favor
of the State of Idaho, to secure the faithful conduct in office of the
deputy treasurer, B. In the latter obligation, the National Co. took no
reinsurance.
A and B connived to defraud the state of about $147,ooo. Of
this amount it was proved that $22,ooo was directly traceable to B's
misfeasance.

The state recovered from the National Co. on the bond of A, the
full amount of the loss. No action was brought on the bond of the
deputy, B. The National Co. made demand upon the Massachusetts
Co. for one-eighth of the total'loss on the contract of reinsurance, and,
the latter refusing to pay, brought suit. The District Court awarded
judgment for the National Co., but in doing so made an allowance of
one-sixteenth of $22,000 or $1375, a pro rata share of the loss attributable to the deputy, B, on the theory that it was a recourse and benefit
accruing to the National Co. out of its relation as surety on the bond
of A, to which the Massachusetts Co. was entitled to be subrogated.3
Upon writ of error brought by the National Co., the Circuit Court
reversed that part of the judgment making the allowance of $1375.
The court's reasoning may be summarized as follows:
(i) A and B were joint tortfeasors. There is no contribution
among such persons. It follows that there is no contribution among
the sureties of joint tortfeasors.
(The court, however, was unwilling to rest its decision on this
ground alone.)
(2) This is not a case calling for contribution among insurers
because there is no identity of risks insured. The bond given for the
treasurer was separate and distinct from that given for the deputy.
(3) .The Massachusetts Co.'s right of subrogation gives it no
greater rights than those possessed by its immediate principal, the
National Co., and since the latter was not bound to take recourse'
against itself, it has no liability on the deputy bond which the Massachusetts Co. may enforce.
'As the case came up in the district court, National Surety Co. v. Mass.
Bonding & Ins. Co:, Southern District of New York, decided April 8, 1926 (not
officially reported), Mack, J., said, "In the instant case the $2oo,ooo bond
covered the wrongdoing not only of Allen [the treasurer] but of all his subordinates, including Coleman [the deputy]." The Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the bond of the treasurer did not cover the wrongdoing of any subordinates.
' This note is based upon the circuit court's interpretation.
'For a discussion of the principles upon which the lower court calculated
the allowance at $,375, see Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 878.

NOTES

The reasoning of the majority was criticized in a dissenting opinion on the following grounds:
(i) The right of sureties to contribution is worked out through
the creditor or injured party and not through the tortfeasors. Hence
the rule as to contribution among tortfeasors is inapplicable to the
sureties.
(2) The Massachusetts Co., the indemnitor, having been called
upon to pay the surety's loss, is entitled to be subrogated to the state's
right against the deputy and his surety, just as the National Co. would
have been. The mere fact that the deputy's surety is the National
Co. itself is not a bar to the subrogee's right. The Massachusetts Co.
is in equity entitled to contribution in the same manner as if a third
company had been the surety on the deputy's bond.
To adopt the view of the majority of the court, reasons the dissenting opinion, would be to permit the risk of ultimate loss to depend
upon the caprice of the injured party in making its choice 6f bonds
upon which to sue.
The novelty of the problem presented is indicated by the fact that
no cases in point were cited in either opinion. It would seem that the
exact question has never before been raised. With the tremendous
growth of the surety bonding business and the increasing policy of
spreading the risks by reinsurance, the situation in the instant case
may very likely confront the courts again. Will the decision in the
principal case be followed?
Let us examine for a moment a few fundamental principles which
are involved in the problem. It is a well-recognized doctrine of suretyship law that co-sureties are entitled to contribution for a loss arising out of the same risk.4 It is also a well-settled proposition that a
surety of a surety who has paid and discharged the principal obligation has the equity of subrogation to the securities and remedies of
the first surety, and hence is entitled to contribution in the same manner as was the original surety.'
Although it is true that there is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors, the surety of one wrongdoer upon paying the full loss to
the injured party is subrogated to the rights of the latter against the
other tortfeasor. 6 It follows that if the second tortfeasor has a surety
which was available for the benefit of the injured party, the subrogee
may proceed against such surety.7
'STEARNS, SUanrYSHIP (3d ed. 1922) 473.
" SHELDON, SUBROGATION (1893) § Io6. Hackensack

Brick Co. v. Borough

of Bogota, 86 N. J. Eq. 143 (I916). See also Rittenhouse v. Levering, 6 Watts
& Serg. I9o (Pa. 1843).
'National Surety Co. v. State Savings Bank, I56 Fed. 21 (C. C. A. 8th,

i9o7); American Bond. Co. v. National Mechanics Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 Ati.
5 PomEROY, EQUITY (4th ed. igig) § 2351.
'See McCormick's Administrator v. Irwin, 35 Pa. 1n (186o).

395 (9o3).
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Subrogation is one of the broadest of equitable doctrines; mere
technicalities will not be permitted to stand in the way of equality,
since equality is equity."

In American Bonding Co. v. National Mechanics Bank,9 the court
said: "Subrogation is not a matter of strict right, but is purely equitable in its nature, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case and intended to serve the purpose of compelling the
ultimate discharge of a debt or obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it."
An application of the above principles leads to the conclusion that
if in the instant case the deputy's bond had been furnished by a company other than the National, the Massachusetts Co. would have been
subrogated to the claim of the State of Idaho, through the National,
against the surety of the deputy.' 0
The amount that the surety of one tortfeasor should recover from
the other joint tortfeasor, is in itself an absorbing problem. Should
the court allow the surety who has paid the claim a recovery of the full
amount of the loss occasioned by the joint act? It does this when the
second tortfeasor has no surety." This is explained by the fact that
equity applies the strict legal rule as to contribution among joint tortfeasors when one of the parties to the tort is himself the respondent,
since it will not aid a guilty party. A surety of the second tortfeasor,
however, should stand on a better footing in equity, since it is an innocent victim. Even more decisive of the question is the fact that if
the second surety were called upon to pay the first the full amount of
the loss, the former would be subrogated to the injured party's right
against the other surety. In other words, the situation would be like
that of a dog chasing its tail.
With such an enigma, the only reasonable solution is to waive
technicalities and treat the sureties of joint tortfeasors as co-sureties,
even though technically they are not.' 2 We could then apply the doctrine of contribution and have the innocent sureties share equally in
the burden.
If we accept this solution, we have still to consider whether such
contribution can be enforced for the benefit of a surety of a surety
where the original sureties of two wrongdoers are identical. This is
the situation presented by the principal case. To answer this it must
be considered how the surety of a surety wprks out his right of subrogation. The majority of the court in the case discussed, reasoned that
the Massachusetts Co. must work out its right of subrogation through
5 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. I918) § 3537.
'Supra note 6.,
"Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C. 414 (x856).
'National Surety Co. v. State Savings Bank, American Bonding Co. v.
National Mechanics Bank, both supra, note 6.
"As the majority of the court points out, the sureties on the bonds of the
treasurer and the deputy could not technically be co-sureties, because the bonds
covered two distinct persons and risks.
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the National Co., and since the National Co. cannot sue itself, the latter escapes liability on the deputy bond. It cites in support of this,
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines,13 which holds that there can
be no right of subrogation in favor of a marine insurance underwriter
for loss paid on a ship injured by collision, if the ship which was
injured and that which committed the injury were owned by the same
party. As the dissenting opinion points out, however, in the Globe
case the insured was not in the position of one having a right of action
against two joint tortfeasors; in fact there was no right of action
against any wrongdoer.
The rule is sometimes expressed by the courts and text writers
as follows: "The reinsured can take no greater rights than the insured by subrogation." 14 An examination of the cases cited by the
text writers indicates, however, that this expression merely meant
that any defenses which might be available against the insured would
be good as against the reinsured. On the other hand, the process of
subrogation has been often explained as follows: "A surety of a
surety who has paid and discharged the principal obligation, has the
same equity of subrogation to the securities and remedies of the creditor (or injured party) as belonged to the surety for whom he was
bound." '" Applying this statement of the rule, the reinsurer in the
principal case, the Massachusetts Co., would be permitted to take
advantage of the existence of the deputy's bond, since this was a remedy available to the injured party, the state of Idaho.
What is the equity of the situation? The National Company has
received a premium on the deputy bond, separate and distinct from
that to which it was entitled for going surety on the treasurer's bond.
Having received the benefit in the form of this premium on the deputy's bond, should it not be called upon, in equity, to bear some
measure of the burden caused by the default of the deputy? We have
already seen that had a third company been the surety on the bond of
B, such company would have been compelled to contribute its share
of the loss, which contribution would have inured to the benefit of the
Massachusetts Co. Should the fact, then, that the separate bonds are
the obligation of the same surety, defeat the equitable right of the
reinsurer of the surety to contribution?
It has been said 16 "that the law of subrogation rests on broad
equities and is entirely aside from any technicalities ;" and that 17 "in
applying the doctrine of subrogation, technicalities which are not of
an insuperable nature should be disregarded, but the broad equities
Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, i921).
'4Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S.312, 321 (1885).
5 JoYcE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 3538.
' Phienix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., supra note 14; United States
v. American Tobacco Co., I66 U. S.468 (1896). See cases cited in 5 JoYcE,
INSU-ANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 3538, note 2.
13273

5 JoYcE, INsURANcE (2d ed.
"SHELDON, supra note 5.

I918)§ 3537.
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should be sought out as far as possible." Can it be said that the court
in the principal case applied broad rules of equity in deciding that the
Massachusetts Co. was not entitled to an allowance by virtue of the
deputy's bond?
existence
" Whatofis the
the practical effect of such a decision? A company in
the position of the Massachusetts Co. would be tempted to advise the
injured party to sue first on the bond on which there was no reinsurance. One in the place of the National Co. would, on the other
hand, be tempted to urge a single suit on the bond on which reinsurance was carried. The liabilities of the sureties will be determined
by the caprice of the injured party. A liberal view of the broad rules
of subrogation and equity would seem to lead to approval of the
position taken by the dissenting opinion.
A. A.S.
THE STATUS OF HOLDERS OF "PARTICIPATING OPERATION CERTIFICATES" AND THEIR RELATION TO CORPORATE CREDITORS--I-An

oil

company, duly incorporated, issued so-called "participating operation
certificates," in ordinary contract form, whereby the company
for and in consideration of the receipt of two hundred
" .
and fifty dollars and other good and valuable consideration,
agrees to create a fund from the operation of a so-called service
station in the place designated on the reverse side hereof, and to
distribute said fund in the manner hereinafter set forth to the
registered owners of such certificates in said station, and such
distribution shall continue until there shall have been paid on this
certificate the sum of five hundred dollars, whereupon it shall
become null and void.
"To provide the funds hereinbefore mentioned, from the
daily receipts of said station there shall be set aside in a bank one
cent on each gallon of gasoline and five per cent. on all other
merchandise sold by said station, and the fund thus created shall
be distributed every month among the registered holders of these
certificates as their interests shall appear."
Mortgages were given purporting to secure liens in favor of the
holders of these certificates. The holders, attempting to foreclose on
their mortgages, were held only to have rights subordinate to those of
the general creditors of the company, now in bankruptcy.'
In deciding the case of ln re Hawkeye Oil Co., the facts of which
are briefly outlined above, the court cites at length and follows with
approval United States and Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas
and Oil Co.,' a case which arose on similar facts, the difference being
that in the earlier case no mortgages were given, and that in that case
the holders, claiming the fund mentioned in the certificates as against
'In re Hawkeye Oil Co., I9 F. (2d) 15, (D. C. Del. 1927).
2 19 F. (2d) 624 (W. D. Pa. 1924).
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the general creditors of the corporation, were held to have no right to
it' or to that part remaining undistributed when the receivers were
appointed. It was further held that the whole agreement was invalid
as against the general creditors, as creating a special type of preferred
creditors, in fraud of their rights.
The right of the certificate holders to the fund which has been
set aside for them, as in the Keystone case, or to enforce their mortgage liens, as in the Hawkeye case, depends upon the relationship in
which they stand to the corporation and. to the general creditors of
the corporation. Whether this relationship can be fixed as that of
creditor, so that they may be classified as "creditor of bankrupt" s is
the problem to be determined.
In the Keystone case the court did not attempt to pass upon the
exact status of the certificate holders, or to decide definitely whether
they were creditors or stockholders. The court speaks of them as
"creditors or shareholders, whatever they may be," and again as "a
class of preferred creditors or stockholders, whatever you may'call
them." Assuming the view of this court to be correct, that it is
f:'aud on corporate creditors to create in this manner a class of preferred creditors, then its position is sound, since it would undoubtedly
be fraud on corporate creditors to allow preference over their claims
to any class of shareholder. 4 Even granting that the petitioners are
creditors, this court, "on general principles of public policy," would
declare the contract void as in fraud of the general creditors. But
preferred creditors, whose claims are superior to those of general
creditors, are commonly found in all manner of corporate financing.'
In making this assumption the court seems to have been unduly.influenced by the suspicion that naturally accompanies novelty. It is an
assumption which must be made to avoid answering the question:
Are these certificate holders a speies of shareholders or creditors?
For unless it be conceded that to allow the claim of the certificate
holders would be fraud whether they be shareholders or creditors,
their true relationship must be ascertained.
The courts in both instances state this to be a problem not free
from difficulty. As usual in borderline problems involving intention
as expressed in a contract which brings into combination incidents
'Sec. 63 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 562 (I898), U. S. C.
(1925) TIT. ii, § io3.
"An agreement of a corporation to create a lien in favor of preferred shareholders, and thus to give them a preference over'general creditors of the corporation, in the absence of statutory authority, is illegal. Jefferson Banking Co. v.
Trustees of Martin Institute, 146 Ga. 383, 91 S. E. 463 (1916) ; Ellsworth v.
Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 191o) ; Cass v. Realty Securities Co., 148
App. Div. 96, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1O74 (1911).
'Many jurisdictions permit even the directors or other officers in charge of
the assets who are also creditors, to secure a preference to themselves over general creditors by means of mortgage or otherwise. Sustained usually on the
ground that the officers are not in any fiduciary relationship with the creditors.
Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid, Murdoch & Co., 159 Ind. 614, 64 N. E. 870
(i902).
See also CLARK, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1916) 753, note 37.
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belonging to contrasting relationships, the difficulty is to determine
which elements govern, not necessarily by weight of number but
rather by importance and essentiality. For the ordinary case, the
rules governing such a situation are clear and well established. 6
Shareholder, broadly, means a person who is a member of the

corporation, evidenced by some degree of proprietary control over
the enterprise, and some beneficial interest in the common fund. The
trouble is that creditors might also possess these elements to some

degree without becoming shareholders; in many respects the two
classes overlap.
The certificates under discussion provide that the holders are to
be paid wholly and only from the "sinking fund," 7 the existence of

which was to be governed by the sale of gasoline and merchandise.
They do not represent ownership in the capital of the corporation;
and as pointed out by the court, the fund bears no special relationship
to the moneys contributed.
In the sense that the holders became
vitally interested in the continued success of the company, since the
rate of return was made to depend on that very thing, the holders
seem to be nearer to the position of shareholders. They are interested, however, in a different manner than shareholders. The entire

contribution of the holders was to be repaid out of the sale of gasoline
and supplies. In contrast to this, shareholders are interested, (i) in
the net profits, and only to the extent that dividends, which may vary
' "The relation of the holder of preferred stock is, in some aspects, similar
to that of creditor; but his is not a creditor, save as to dividends, after. the same
are declared. Nor does he sustain a dual relation with the corporation. He is
either a stockholder or a creditor. He cannot by virtue of the same certificate
be both. If the former, he takes a risk in the concerns of the company, not only
as to dividends and a proportion of the assets on the dissolution of the company,
but as to statutory liability for debts in case the company becomes insolvent. If
the latter, he takes no interest in the company's affairs, is not concerned in its
property or profits as such, but his whole right is to receive agreed compensation
for the use of the money he furnishes, and the return of the principal when due.
Whether he is one or the other depends upon a proper construction of the contract he holds with the company." Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N.
E. 496 (i08o).
"There is a palpable difference between the relation of a stockholder and a
creditor to the corporate property. Stock, whether preferred or not, is capital;
and generally speaking, a certificate of stock merely evidences the amount which
the holder has contributed to or ventured in the enterprise. Such a certificate,
representing nothing more than the extent of his ownership in the capital, cannot be treated as indicating that he is, by virtue of it alone, also to the same
extent a creditor who may compete with other creditors. . . . He cannot, if
he is simply a shareholder, in the nature of things, so far as third persons are
concerned, be at one and the same time and by force of the same certificate both
part owner of the property and creditor of the company for that portion of its
capital which stands in his name. . . . As his chance of gain throws on the
stockholder, as respects creditors, the entire risk of the loss of his contribution to
the capital stock, it is a fixed characteristic of capital stock that no part of it
can be withdrawn for the purpose of repaying the principal of the capital until
the debts of the corporation are satisfied." Reagan Bale Co. v. Heuermann, 149
S. W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
"The fund described in the certificates had been deposited in various banks
in the name of the corporation, and designated "bond fund," or "sinking fund."
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greatly in amount, are declared out of such net' profits at the discretion
of the directors, and, (2) in the assets of the company after all corporate debts have been paid, and only upon dissolution of the company.
The name given to a security or evidence of debt is not determinative of the status of the holder. For example, the fact that it
is denominated preferred.stock is not conclusive, but the fact that it
is so denominated is given weight.8 So, in the case of the certificates
before the court, the fact that the parties*called their contract something other than stock, while not decisive, is an indication that the
purchasers were to be considered, and did consider themselves, something other than shareholders. The word "interest" does not appear,
and on the other hand, the words "share," "stock," and "dividend"
seem to have been carefully avoided. The contract is silent on the
matter of voting, or any other manner of proprietary control on the
part of the holders over the affairs of the corporation, nor can any
such intention be read into the contract.9 On the contrary, the general tenor of the transaction negatives such a suggestion.
The most important inquiry has been said to be "whether a date
has been fixed within which the company is bound to pay the preferred shares, for all true debts must fall due sometime." "0 "The
certificate cannot create a debt where no time is fixed when the principal shall become due and payable." 11 In the case of Savannah Real
Estate, Loan and Building Co. v. Silverberg,12 holders of so-called
"preferred stock" certificates were held to be creditors. The certificates were denominated stock, though the holders were denied the
right to vote. They provided for a dividend of 8%o, not to be' paid
absolutely and at all events, but only in the event that the corporation
earned enough to pay each holder that amount. In no case were the
holders to receive more than 8%. The most salient feature of the
contract was that the amount specified in the certificate "shall be
retired" on a given date. This stipulation requiring the company absolutely to retire the stock at a given date led the court to the conclusion
that the certificates, in other respects shares, were really evidences of
debt-it was a contract under which "one party was to receive money
for the use of its business and return the same in any event at a designated time-paying as interest thereon a certain proportion of the
earnings made in the enterprise." The interest, to be paid in the
a Spencer v. Smith,

201

Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); Kidd v. Puritana

Cereal Food Co., 145 Mo. App. 502, 122 S. W. 784 (19o9) ; Heller v. National
Marine Bank, 89 Md. 6o2, 43 Atl. 8oo (1899) ; Burt v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 116
(1876) ; Warren v. Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154, 87 Atl. 595 (1913).
'The certificates, being silent on this point, present a stronger case that no
such right may be inferred than does a case where a clause denying the right
to vote, is inserted, since such a clause would not be inserted unless the parties
considered that they were dealing in shares.
10
Kidd v. Puritana Cereal Food Co., supra note 8.
'Jefferson Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, supra note 4.
io8
i Ga. 28r, 33 S. E. 9o8 (1899).
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form of a dividend, was contingent, but the return of the principal
was not. The holders were interested in the success of the enterprise
only in that it regulated the return they would receive, in no case to
exceed 8%. The court, in Coggeshallv.Georgia Land and Investment
Co.,1 s discussed and approved the Silverberg case. The certificates
in this case were similar to those in the Silverberg case, save that the
words "tay be retired" instead of "shall be retired" were used. Thus,
in the Coggeshall case, the holders were not assured of the return of
their original contribution in any event, and on this ground the court
distinguishes the two cases, holding the Coggeshall certificates to be
shares, and at the same time expressing* itself as entirely in accord
with the decision in the Silverberg case. 14
This important feature is found to be lacking in the certificates
under discussion. No clause in the contract obliges the corporation
to pay anything in any event. There is no separation or distinction
to be maintained between principal and interest or principal and dividends. As already pointed out, the holders were to be paid entirely
out of a fund which was itself contingent. They were to be paid
double the amount of their contribution at some time or other, and
this might be more or less than the ordinary rate of interest. The
hope or expectation, of course, was that this rate would exceed the
normal rate of interest. No time was fixed within which the principal and increment, whether it be interest or dividend, was to be paid.
It is difficult to imagine a creditor to whom nothing is owed absolutely and at all events.
Inquiry, so far, leads to the conclusion that the certificate holders
can be neither creditors or shareholders. A fallacy often indulged in
is the assumption that something must be one thing or another. It is
said in the cases that one cannot by virtue of the same instrument
become both creditor and shareholder, but it does not follow that by
virtue of the transaction he must become one or the other. The court
in the Hawkeye case, though citing with approval the decision found
U 14 Ga. App. 637, 82 S. E. 156 (1914).
" Holders of "preferred stock" certificates were held to be creditors, where
the corporation guaranteed payment of principal and interest at a specified time.
Burt v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 13i (1876).
"Where preferred stock makes the holders assured of dividends, gives them
a right to compel repayment of the par value of the stock, and precludes them
from voting or sharing in any surplus, it creates the relation of debtor and
creditor, and the stock is void as stock." Wright v. Johnson, 183 Ia. 8o7, 167
N. W. 68o (i9i8).
And in Cook v. Equitable B. & L. Assn., 104 Ga. 814, 30 S. E. g9i (1898),
a corporation issued "coupon stock" bearing interest at 6 per cent. payable semiannually, and for which the holders paid the face value, with the privilege, after
go days' notice, of receiving back the moneys thus paid, and with a like privilege
on the part of the corporation of calling in the stock. This was held to be a
borrowing of the money by the corporation. But see Westerfield-Bonte Co. v.
Burnett, 76 Ky. 188, i95 S. W. 477 (1917); Rider v. John G. Delker & Sons
Co., I45 Ky. 634, 140 S. W. lOll (I911); Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 142 Minn.
127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919) ; Warren v. Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154, 87 Atl. 595
(19,3).
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in the Keystone case, and having found that the certificate holders
were not creditors, advances the true reason why they cannot be
allowed the preference they claim, namely, because they were "coadventurers with the stockholders, hazarding their investment upon
the continued operation, and hence upon the success, of the company."
It is a fair, if not inevitable interpretation of the contract that in
return for the possibility of receiving double the amount of their
investment in a length of time that .would make the return far in
excess of the legal rate of interest, the purchasers of these certificates
assumed the risk of losing their investment, which, in any case, depended on the success of the enterprise. As co-adventurers their
claim cannot be allowed.' "
An interesting problem will arise when a court is called upon to
determine the relationship in which these certificate holders stand to
the shareholders themselves.
S.D.B.
INABILITY

OF A PARTNER

TO HAVE

BANKRUPT AGAINST THE WILL OF

His

His FIRm

ADJUDICATED

CO-PARTNERs-The question

whether one partner can force his firm into bankruptcy

1

over the

objections of his co-partners has been
raised again by two cases
2
recently decided in the district courts.
Before the United States Supreme Court case of Meek v. Centre
County Banking Co.3 in many instances one partner was able to accomplish the firm's bankruptcy in spite of the dissent of his fellows.
The cases are not all decided on the same theory. Six years after the
passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 a firm was adjudicated bankrupt on the petition of one partner in which the others refused to
concur.4 There was no averment of an act of bankruptcy in the
petition, but, the court held that the petition itself was an act of bankruptcy on behalf of the firm and dispensed with the need for alleging
any other act. Later the same result was reached on similar facts but
by different reasoning.5 The court denied that the petition by one
partner was an act of bankruptcy on behalf of the firm, but held that
thereby a proceeding was instituted in which the court acquired jurisdiction to adjudge the firm bankrupt if the facts warranted adjudicaSee 6 FLETCER,

CoRPOATIONS (igig) § 3634.

'A partnership cannot be adjudicated bankrupt unless the assets of the
members in excess of their individual debts, plus the assets of the partnership
are insufficient to pay partnership debts. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695
(1913).

In re McCloskey, I8 F. (2d) 311 (E. D. Pa. 1926) ; In re York, 18 F. (2d)
428 (N. D. Tex. 1927).
'268 U. S. 426 (1924).
'In re Forbes, 128 Fed. 137 (D. C. Mass. 19o4).
5In re Ceballos, I6I Fed. 445 (D. C. N. J. i9o8).
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tion. Shortly thereafter a petition by one partner was considered a
voluntary proceeding, in respect to the firm, in which the averment of
a firm act of bankruptcy was not required.
The firm was adjudicated bankrupt.
Thus one partner was able against the objections of his copartners to have the firm adjudicated bankrupt either in an involuntary proceeding 7 or in a voluntary one 8 until about 1916. From that
time there seems to have been a tendency to limit the partner's powers
in this respect; and it had already been held in 1915 that a partner's
authority to run the business does not include the authority to consent
to a petition by the creditors of the firm, since such action is disruptive and not in furtherance of the firm business.9 However, from a
decision in 1921 that a voluntary petition on behalf of the firm must
be signed by all the partners, and that the failure of all to join rendered the proceeding involuntary, requiring the averment of an act
of bankruptcy in addition to.proof of insolvency in order to have the
firm adjudicated, it would seem that the court still sanctioned involuntary proceedings against the firm at the instance of one partner.' 0
The Meek "- case seems to settle the question of a partner's right
to force the firm into involuntary bankruptcy, in the negative. In
that case a petitioner in voluntary bankruptcy sought to file a petition
on behalf of the partnership of which he was a member. The court
refused either to sustain it as the voluntary petition of the firm since
it was signed by only one partner, or to pass on the right of a partner
to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on behalf of the firm. The
court held that it was an involuntary petition as to the firm since the
other members objected, and said that it would lie only at the instance
of creditors.
In the recently decided cases of In re McCloskey and In re
York 12 the facts are substantially the same as in the Meek case. In
both the former, however, the courts treat the petitions as voluntary
and hold that one partner has no authority to file such a petition for the
firm. The court considers it a disruptive act equivalent to an assignment for the benefit of creditors, which one partner has no authority
to make.13 In both, the broad dictum of the Meek case, that to adjudge a partnership a voluntary bankrupt all the partners must join
in the petition, and that it cannot be adjudged an involuntary bank'In re Junck & Balthazard, 169 Fed. 481 (E.D. Wis. io9). Accord: In.
re
Hansley & Adams, 228 Fed. 564 (S.D. Cal. 1916).
'Supra note 4.
' Supra notes -5and 6.
' Steiner, Lobman & Frank v. T. S. Faulk & Co., 222 Fed. 6I (C. C. A.
5th, 1915).
*In re Ollinger & Perry, 274 Fed. 970 (S. D. Ala. i921).
uSupra note 3. See Note (1925) 4 TEx. L. Rv.io2.
Supra note 2.
Hill v. Postly, go Va. 200, 17 S. E. 946 (1893) ; Mill% v. Miller, iog Iowa
688, 8I N. W. 169 (1899).
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rupt otherwise than by the -petition of creditors, is repeated. Some
believe this causes no hardship to the petitioning partner since he can
call for the dissolution of the firm in equity.14 In addition, in the
petition for his own bankruptcy he can schedule firm debts and be
discharged from them, 5 the firm being wound up as provided in the
Bankruptcy Act of x898.6
It is submitted, however, that where a partnership is heavily
indebted, but still has a slight surplus of firm assets over firm debts
so as not to be insolvent as to firm creditors, and in addition owes the
petitioning partner for advances or loans, not capital, a sum which
together with the firm debts is greater than the firm assets, the petitioner should be regarded as any other creditor. As such he ought to
be permitted to bring the firm into the bankruptcy court. The fact
that he has the remedy of dissolution in the state courts is no reason
for precluding him from enjoying the benefits which the bankruptcy
laws grant ordinary creditors. It would seem advantageous to settle
the whole matter of the individual and firm bankruptcies in one proceeding.
J.B.
THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO DEMAND OBLIGATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA-The federal courts have

recently handed down a decision I touching upon, but not deciding, a
much disputed point in Pennsylvania law. The statute of limitations,
while theoretically definite and clear in its language, provides numerous difficulties in its application to the most ordinary commercial
problems. The present case furnishes a glimpse of the many ramifications into which it leads. The plaintiff had secured a promise
from the defendant corporation to pay to the plaintiff within a
reasonable time after demand in Pittsburgh the sum of fifty thousand dollars. After twenty-one years of silence, the plaintiff
demanded payment, and upon refusal, brought action. The court
decided that a demand was a prerequisite to the plaintiff's cause of
action, but in view of the lapse of twenty-one years, which the court
deemed an unreasonable length of time, the plaintiff's rights had been
barred by the operation of the statute of limitations.2 The decision is
CoT. L. REV. 964. Uniform Partnership Act 32e, f.
"In re Loughlin, 96 Fed. 589 (D.C. Iowa, 1899) ; In re Russel, 97 Fed.
" (1925) 25

(D. C. Iowa, I899).
"Section 5h: 30

STAT.

32

547 (1898), U. S. C. (1925) Tn,. ii, § 23h.

Guffey v. Gulf Production Co., 17 F. (2d) 926 (W. D. Pa. 1926), 17 F.
A. 3d, 1927).
'Act of 1713, I Sm.L. 76 § i, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 13857: "All actions
of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty . . . shall
be brought . . . within six years next after the cause of such actions or
suit, and not after."
(2d) 932 (C. C.

Act of May 28, 1715, I Sm. L. 9o § 6, PA. STAT. (West, I92O) § 13861:
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in harmony with the spirit of the statute, but one cannot help wondering within what period of time a demand must be made on a demand
obligation in Pennsylvania by a promisee, and whether the right of
action lapses at the expiration of that period, or whether the period
fixed by the statute of limitations is an allotment of time additional
to that granted for a demand. The court rendering the decision commented briefly upon these points of interest, but failed to express an
opinion, as it was unnecessary for the decision of the case. It is the
purpose of this note to review the way in which the Pennsylvania
courts have treated cases bearing on this subject and to attempt to
ascertain the principles which, at the present day, are controlling.
As a fundamental principle, it may be said that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run'until a cause of action has accrued.3
But just when the cause of action has accrued is usually the subject
of dispute, for upon the answer to this question is suspended practically every case concerning the statute of limitations. And in no
field of this body of law is ihere greater confusion than in demand
obligations. In the State of Pennsylvania alone, the decisions are
quite confusing and require rigid analysis.
Ordinarily a demand obligation implies a condition precedent,
namely, that a demand be made before a right of action accrues.
However, certain necessary exceptions have arisen. The courts have
been quite uniform in deciding that negotiable instruments and other
obligations involving money payable on demand, for the purpose of
starting the statute of limitations, are due immediately,4 They reason
that a demand note is due immediately, for it is intended that the
payee or his indorsee should have an immediate right of action upon
the instrument, and that a demand will be presumed from the very
nature of the instrument.5 Any failure to take advantage of this
right is considered negligence. This reasoning, while based upon a
fictitious presumption, finds forceful justification in the fact that business expediency demands that negotiable instruments be retired as
soon as possible. They cannot be permitted to circulate indefinitely.
This class of cases therefore embraces situations where no demand is
necessary to a cause of action upon demand instruments. An imme"That all and every such actions on such promissory notes shall be commenced,
sued, and brought within such time as is appointed for commencing or suing
actions upon the case, by an act of this province," etc. The statute referred
to provides that actions be brought "within six years next after the cause of
such actions or suits, and not after": Act of 1713, I Sm. L. 76 §I.
§1I8.
'WILLISTON, CONiRACTS (1920) §2040; I WOOD, LIMITATIONs (893)
'WILLISTON, supra note 3, §2040; (1918) 87 CENT. L. J. io: "An account
or note payable on demand is payable immediately; . . . there need be no
special demand, . . . the statute of limitations commences to run from the
51 CHIc. LEG. N. i19: "Limitation runs
date of the note or account." (918)
against demand obligations from date of paper on paper obligations ;" Laforge
v. Jayne, 9 Pa. 410 (1848) (demand note); Rhines v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192
(187o) (duebill).
'Cases supra note 4.
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diate demand is implied. When viewed thus, the solution is apparently simple, for the cause of action accrues without a demand, and
the statute is set in motion.
However, where a demand is recognized as a prerequisite to a
cause of action, the courts encounter untold difficulties, as factual
differences in the cases have caused an apparent conflict in the decisions. For example, the Pennsylvania tribunals have been unanimous in deciding that certified checks 6 and certificates of deposit,7
while negotiable demand instruments, still require a demand. The
legal justification for these superficial inconsistencies is found in the
analogy of certified checks and certificates of deposit to bank deposits,8 which require a demand to start the operation of the statute,
from the very nature of the obligation. It would seem, therefore,
that certain negotiable demand instruments do require a demand to
perfect a cause of action. Naturally, this results in a pyramiding of
exceptions.
Stock subscriptions payable upon demand, call, or assessment, are
responsible in the main for the utter confusion on this subject. Some
justices have failed to consider the true nature of this contract, while
others, when confronted with a unique case, have used language in
support of their decisions which is so general in its terms as to provide pitfalls for subsequent courts. Needless to say, this has resulted
in seeming vacillation and apparently contradicting authorities. The
following discussion of the cases is illustrative.
In an early case, 9 the court decided that the statute begins to run
only when a call for the subscription is made. In 1858,10 the pendulum
had described another arc, for Woodward, J., decided, "If, therefore,
an action would not lie without a previous demand, and the time for
that is gone, the action is gone. But if the action would lie without
a legal and valid demand, then it is barred by statute." This famous
case intimates that an action must be brought within six years, the
statutory period, or the right of action lapses. The reasoning is
seemingly specious, for it fails to take cognizance of the fact that the
contract, from its very nature, indicates an uncertain lapse of time
before a demand will be made. The decision in its language unfortunately seems to place contracts of this type on an equality with
negotiable instruments. Such a conclusion seems at first untenable,
but Chief Justice Mitchell, discussing the case subsequently,11 pointed
out that the plaintiff had abandoned its corporate enterprise, and this
'Girard Bank v. Bank, 39 Pa. 92 (I861); Finkbone's Appeal, 8.6 Pa. 368

(1878) ; Bulliet v. Trust Co., 284 Pa. 561, 131 Atl. 471 (1925).
'McGough v. Jameson, io7 Pa. 336 (1884) ; Gardner's Estate,
77 At. 509 (I9Io).

228

Pa.

282,

v. Allegheny Trust Co., 26o Pa. 64, 1O3 Adt. 528 (1918).
149 (Pa. 1831).
Accord: Ry. v. Graham, 36 Pa. 77
IGRy. v. Byers, 32 Pa. 22 (1858).
'Osterling

'Sinkler v. Turnpike Co., 3 P. & W.

(1859).
' Carpenter v. Cook, 212 Pa. 165, 61 At. 799 (19o).
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factor alone would establish a complete defense to an action. Naturally, this makes the utterance dictum.
In the case of Allibone v. Hager,12 the facts showed that the
plaintiff corporation had been prosecuting work according to its charter, and resulted in the decision that the statute did not begin to run
for a period of eleven years, as the subscribing stockholder's liability
was- intended to be continuing. The decision is sound for the nature
of a subscribing shareholder's obligation demands an unusual length
of time. The next case 13 involved a corporation which had been insolvent for more than six years, and resulted logically in the decision
that the cause of action had been barred by the statute, for a call was
presumed to have been made when insolvency occurred. The important case of Swearingen v. Dairy Co.'" is practically identical in its
facts and decision, for again insolvency was the salient characteristic
and deciding factor. The later cases 15 take the reasonable view that
no action accrues until a demand is made or insolvency occurs, as such
was within the contemplatidn of the parties at the time of making the
contract. The statute, therefore, cannot operate until that time. It
appears that the rule generally stated in the early cases that a promisee
has six years within which to make demand cannot be applied to this
class of cases, for it is understood that only necessity or insolvency
will be the occasion for a demand, and no definite time limit can be
set which would determine whether such a right has accrued. These
cases, as has been pointed out by Professor Williston, 8 are contingent
upon the happening of a future event which may or may not occur,
and therefore the statute cannot, within any reasonable conception,
run against them until the cause of action accrues.
In other contracts for the payment of money on demand, the
same historical background may be found. The early cases 17 decided
that "When the time for doing an act, necessarily precedent to bringing suit is indefinite, it allows a reasonable time. When that reasonable time has elapsed, the duty of diligence begins." Here, it seems
that a reasonable time (six years by analogy to the statute) is granted
within which to make a demand. However, the above is dictum, for
Allibone v. Hager, 46 Pa. 48 (1863).
"3Franklin Bank v. Bridges, 20 W. N. C. 43 (Pa. 1887).
""In Swearingen v. Dairy Co., i98 Pa. 68, 47 Atl. 941 (igoi), the court
established certain rules, viz.: (i) In an obligation for the payment of money
on demand, the statute runs at once. Suit is a sufficient demand and must be
made in six years. (2) Payment on condition or time after demand. Demand
is necessary to a right of action and statute doesn't run till demand. (3) It is
undecided whether a demand, if necessary, must be made in six years. Accord,
except as to the third classification, which is deemed unnecessary, Cook v.
Carpenter, supra note II.
Kirschler v. Wainwright. 255 Pa. 525, ioo Atl. 484 (917) ; Harrigan v.
Bergdoll, 281 Pa. 186, 126 Atl. 269 (1924).
', Wn.LISTON, supra note 3, §2041.
"Steele's Adms. v. Steele, 25 Pa. 154 (1855); Waterman v. Brown, 31 Pa.
161 0858).
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the court also employed the presumption that a lapse of twenty years
precludes an action. The succeeding cases I decided that the statute
does not run until a contemplated future event has occurred, or a reasonable time has elapsed. No effort was made to define a reasonable
length of time, and it is conjectural whether a court would limit a
reasonable time in all cases to six years. Manifestly, such a decision
would not meet the exigencies of every situation; the rule would
lack a necessary flexibility. Considering the many different types of
contracts, the divergence in factual situations, as well as the intentions
of the parties in consummating a contract, extreme elasticity is necessary in order to handle adequately the application of the statute of
limitations to demand obligations. Each particular kind of contract
manifests characteristics and interpretive needs which demand individual treatment in order to mete out justice. It is arbitrary to say
that six years is a reasonable time within which a demand must be
made for all contracts; but, on the other hand, an indefinite length of
time leads to an unusual prolongation of contractual rights, which
obviously is contrary to the purpose and spirit of the statute. It
would seem that this question of time must remain within the discretion of the judicial body hearing or reviewing the case, until a
sufficient number of decisions adequately covering each kind of demand obligation has established uniformity and stability.
The court in the case of Guffey v. Gulf Production Co.19 logically
arrived at the conclusion that
"where a demand is necessary to furnish a cause of action, and
the time.of demand is within the control of the plaintiff, that
demand must be made within a reasonable time. In other words,
the statute of limitations cannot be extended by the act, or failure
to act, of the plaintiff. . . . The exceptions to the general
rule are in the nature of suits on bank deposits, or involving continuing trusts, and suits on stock subscriptions. In all such cases
the time of demand is not wholly within the control of the plaintiff, or the cause of action arises only upon the happening of certain contingencies."
It is submitted that this lucid analysis
provides the only practicable solution,
types of contracts require sometimes
chanical, applications of the statute of

of the problem by Gibson, I.,
for it recognizes that various
discretionary, sometimes melimitations.
G.M.

Smith v. Bell, 1o7 Pa. 352 (1884) (payable on a future event) ; Himrod
v. Kimberly, 219 Pa. 546, 69 Adt. 72 (i9o8) (lapse of eight years before suing).
"Supra note r.

